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SECTARIANISM IN SCOTLAND: 
A CONTEMPORARY ASSESSMENT AND EXPLANATION 
Steve Bruce 
In November 1985 the Conservative government led by Margaret 
Thatcher signed an accord with the Irish Republic which gave Dublin a role 
in representing the interest of Catholics in Ulster. Ulster Unionists began a 
campaign of protest against what they saw as an important step towards a 
united Ireland. Some Scottish Protestants, offended by what for them was 
the Tory Party's abandonment of unionism, formed a Scottish Unionist 
Party and threatened to stand against Conservatives with thin majorities at 
the next general election. Had there been any great support in Scotland for 
Ulster unionism such splitting of the right-wing vote would have killed off 
the Conservative Party on Scotland. As it was, the SUP decided not to field 
candidates but to recommend tactical voting for the person most likely to 
beat the Conservative and that the recommendation made no difference to 
the result merely demonstrated the lack of interest in Ulster and illustrated 
the irrelevance of religion in Scottish politics. 
My aim is to clarify an argument about the importance of sectarianism 
in contemporary Scotland, to evaluate evidence, and to present an 
explanation for the decline of the salience of religion in Scotland. 
The Historical Background 
Most Catholics in Scotland are descendants of Irish immigrants. Most 
of the native Scots were and are Protestants. The Lowlands embraced the 
Reformation. The Highlands remained Catholic or Epjscopalian until the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century but then converted to 
evangelical Calvinism. Small pockets of Catholicism and Episcopalianism 
remained in the western highlands and in parts of the north-east lowlands, 
such as Banff and Buchan. However, Scotland became and remains a 
predominantly Protestant country. The vast majority of Roman Catholics 
in Scotland came from Ireland and settled, first in the western Lowlands, 
and then spread to Edinburgh and West Lothian and parts of Fife. The bulk 
of the settlement coincided with the industrialisation of Scotland. (t) 
No-one doubts that the Irish in Scotland were initially the victims of 
both disadvantage and active discrimination. The same relative lack of 
economic and political power which led them to migrate in the first place 
caused them to enter the Scottish labour market at the bottom. Many were 
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indigent. Others were willing to undercut the wages of Scottish workers and 
to act as strike-breakers. (2) There was considerable conflict between the 
Irish and the native Scots. Hardly surprisingly, the social and economic 
conflict fueled religious enmity. The poverty and low levels of education of 
the Irish were taken by Scots Protestants as evidence of the social evils of 
Catholicism. Interestingly, Protestants did not have a monopoly of anti-
Irish prejudice and discrimination. As Handley's excellent histories 
demonstrate, the old Scots Catholics were barely less hostile. <3l Even long 
after the Irish had come to outnumber indigenous Scots Catholics, the 
hierarchy remained entirely Scottish. 
In No Pope of Rome, I argued that sectarianism in Scotland has 
become an irrelevance: 'just a boy's game'. Why anti-Catholicism should 
have faded so quickly when it remains a powerful sentiment in Ulster will be 
explained shortly. Firstly, there is the issue of the salience of religio-ethnic 
conflict in contemporary Scotland. A number of scholars, either in 
published reviews or in private correspondence, have suggested that the 
assessment presented in No Pope of Rome is altogether too sanguine.<4l 
The Evidence of Sectarianism 
There is considerable superficial evidence of sectarianism, if by that 
rather loose journalistic term we mean the aggressive display in the public 
sphere of religious and ethnic differences which, in modern societies, are 
supposed to be confined to the private world as matters of 'personal 
preference'. City walls are still daubed with slogans such as 'Fuck the Pope'. 
Gangs of working class youths who identify themselves (and each other) as 
'prods' and 'taigs' sometimes battle in the streets. Positions of support for 
the sides in the Ulster conflict are sympathetically struck and diluted forms 
of that conflict are replayed in Glasgow and Edinburgh. Some descendents 
of Irish Catholics march under 'Troops Out' banners and small numbers of 
young Orangemen organise counter-protests. Both Glasgow and 
Edinburgh have a Catholic and a Protestant football team. Until 1986, 
Glasgow Rangers refused to sign Catholics. Although Glasgow Celtic have 
had the odd Protestant on their staff, supporters continue to see the club as 
a Catholic club and the tricolour - the flag of the Irish Republic - is 
regularly displayed by Celtic supporters. 
Bill Murray, the author of a recent book on Celtic and Rangers, sees 
such displays as evidence that sectarianism is still a force in Scotland. (SlIt is 
my contention that these phenomena are of little importance (except to the 
small numbers of people who take part in them). If we adopt the metaphor 
of an iceberg, I contend that the relatively rare public displays of sectarian 
animosity are not the visible tip of a submerged mass of ice but are rather all 
that is left. My critics believe that there is still a sizeable piece of sectarian 
ice under the surface. 
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Evidence can be searched for in a number of places. We can begin with 
formal law. Since the 1829 Emancipation Act, Scottish Catholics have 
suffered only the most piffling legal disabilities and these were removed by 
the 1926 Relief Act. However, as the fortunes of American blacks have 
clearly shown, formal law may be no indicator of genuine equality. In any 
consideration of political equality. what matters is not so much the legal 
right to vote but the ability to turn the franchise into political power. Here 
the evidence seem clearly on the side of those who argue that the Irish who 
settled in Scotland have been successfully assimilated. Perhaps because 
they refrained from forming separate Catholic trade unions and parties, 
and instead became involved in the secular labour movement. Scottish 
Catholics have attained considerable power. <6l The Labour Party in the 
lowlands of Scotland (and especially in Strathclyde) is at least Catholic in 
proportion to the presence of Catholics and it has been in power in Glasgow 
since the nineteen thirties.(?} 
This is not to say that religion was not a factor in Scottish politics; it 
was. In the early part of this century, many Protestants in the lowland urban 
areas supported first Liberal-Unionists, then Conservative and Unionists 
and, after the Catholic Church had dropped its opposition to 'moderate' 
socialist candidates, the majority of Catholics voted socialist. For a very 
brief period in the nineteen thirties, Protestant parties - Alexander 
Ratcliffe's Scottish Protestant League in Glasgow and John Cormack's 
Protestant Action in Edinburgh - enjoyed considerable success in 
municipal elections. (B) However, that success served only to break the hold 
of the Conservatives on Glasgow Corporation and to allow in a socialist 
administration. For a short period the Orange Order was able to deliver 
working class Protestant votes to Unionist and Conservative candidates but 
this has not been the case since the fifties. And even when the Orange 
Order could deliver the Protestant votes, it made very little difference 
because there were few locations in which this gave them power. Although 
the Order might still like to engage in sectarian politics, the Conservative 
Party has no interest in attracting or sustaining an anti-Catholic vote. Its 
electoral base lies in class politics and the South of England. Interest in 
Orangeism declined to the point that in 1970, the party nominated three 
Catholics and one, Michael Ancram, has since served as chairman of the 
Scottish Conservatives. There has been very little to distinguish the 
Conservative Party's Ulster policy from that of the Labour Party and its 
recent accord with the Dublin government has left the Orange Order 
talking about opposing Conservative candidates in future elections. 
Finally, the odd maverick, such as Pastor Jack Glass, who has tried to 
revive sectarian politics in Scotland has performed embarrassingly badly at 
elections. 
To summarise the situation which has obtained at least since the 
second world war, religious affiliation has played no greater part on the 
politics of Scotland than it does in the politics of the United States or New 
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Zealand. It is certainly not, as those commentators who are struck by the 
behaviour of some football supporters would maintain, comparable to the 
situation in Northern Ireland. This is not to say that some Scots have not 
wished to pursue sectarian politics. It simply means that, irrespective of 
desire, the situation has not permitted it, and in the absence of success even 
those rhetorically committed to such politics have tended to lose heart. 
Political power is important because it gives access to local resources 
such as employment in local government and council housing. I know of no 
evidence that Catholics now fare any worse than Protestants in either of 
these important areas. Given the already mentioned influence of Catholics 
in the Labour Party in Scotland, this is not surprising. Furthermore, the 
management of such resources has, since the war, become more and more 
the preserve of highly mobile middle-class professionals who may in their 
careers move from region to region and are thus very unlikely to share the 
particularist impulses of those local groups who might wish to see 
discriminatory policies pursued. However, this is clearly an empirical issue. 
If evidence of Catholic disadvantage does exist, then it should be published. 
Although electoral politics are important,their study does not exhaust 
the search for evidence of disadvantage or discrimination. What of socio-
economic position? Is there evidence that Roman Catholics are generally 
poorer and of lower status than non-Catholics, and, if so, does an 
explanation of any difference lead us to conclude that there is systematic 
disadvantage or discrimination? The first and most important thing to note 
is the dearth of data. Unlike the Northern Ireland census, the Scottish 
census does not contain a religion question and we are thus denied a vast 
amount of potentially illuminating data. However, the Scottish Mobility 
Survey (SMS) conducted in 1975 did record the type of school attended by 
respondents and thus permits some comparison of the educational 
performances and social mobility of those men who attended Catholic 
schools and those who did not. 
It should be noted that the SMS data refers to people who attended 
school between 1925 and 1972 and is thus already a remembrance ofthings 
past. The main conclusion is that there are statistically significant but small 
differences between the two samples, which increase as one moves towards 
higher levels of qualification. 68.4% of Catholics obtained no exam passes 
at all, as compared with 63.4% of non-Catholics. 5.8% of Catholics 
obtained university entrance qualifications, as compared with 9% of non-
Catholics. As Payne and Ford put it 'the differences tend to be more acute 
at the upper end of the range of qualifications, and since this only applies to 
about 1 in 10 of the sample, it seems unlikely that most pupils' educational 
chances were seriously impaired by religiously-segregated education'. <9l 
Surprisingly, controlling for class suggests that working-class Catholics 
actually perform slightly better than their non-Catholic counterparts, while 
middle-class Catholics seem at a disadvantage. 
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It is also possible to use the SMS data to compare rough rates of social 
mobility for the two populations. Credentials play only a relatively modest 
role in mobility. Almost all of those people with higher education 
qualifications attained middle class jobs, but 'the overwhelming majority of 
persons in the middle class both for Catholics and non-Catholics, pre- and 
post-1933, do not have a high level of education·.(IO) The one highly 
significant finding concerns the upward mobility of those people with low 
levels of education: 'Whereas 22.2% of Catholics from working class 
backgrounds and born before 1933 were able to enter middle class jobs with 
low qualifications, 33.0% of non-Catholics with the same characteristics 
were able to do so and of those born after 1933 only 24.5% of Catholics 
achieved this against 30.0% of non-Catholics. (II) 
Two points should be made about this considerable difference. Firstly, 
as Payne and Ford recognize, they are describing the past. Someone born in 
1940 entered the labour market in 1956: thirty two years ago. Someone 
born in 1950, in 1966: still twenty two years ago, and so on. Secondly, even 
the very crude division around 'born in 1933' (hence entering the labour 
market between 1949 and 1952), shows a considerable improvement in the 
mobility of Catholics. Catholics born before 1933 enjoyed a rate of 
'unearned' mobility which was only 67.3% of that of non-Catholics; for 
those born after 1933 it was 81.7%. Clearly one would need to be able to 
further sub-divide the age bands to see if such a trend continued. 
It is far easier to describe the data than it is to explain it. It may well be 
that the different rates of mobility for the two populations were caused by 
discrimination. Other studies have identified the importance of informal 
contacts in securing jobs. Given that the Irish came into the Scottish labour 
market at the bottom, it only requires Protestants and Catholics to 
consistently favour co-religionists for inequality to persist. Informal aid in 
securing positions will perpetuate the pattern of advantage. The fact that 
the pattern has not been maintained and that non-Catholic advantage has 
been reduced (halved, according to the SMS data) suggests that informal 
discrimination has been diminishing. But this is to present the explanation 
which gives the greatest weight to discriminatory practices. There is 
another highly likely possibility which Payne and Ford describe as "'passive 
discrimination" against Catholics'. (Ill The majority of Catholics are 
concentrated in the poorest areas of Scotland. In 1970, eight out of ten 
Catholic children were in schools in West Central Scotland: the part of 
Scotland with the least potential for social mobility. The pattern of 
settlement established in the nineteenth century thus has a restraining 
effect on Catholics, entirely irrespective of the behaviour of non-Catholics. 
Although Payne and Ford put 'passive discrimination' in inverted commas, 
the use of the term 'discrimination' to describe a disadvantage caused by the 
general decline of a region seems inappropriate. When 'discrimination' is 
the noun form of an active verb, how can it be 'passive'? Who is doing it? 
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What would be illuminating is evidence about the relative fortunes of 
Protestants and Catholics in West Central Scotland but such data are not 
presently available. 
Clearly, the most obvious conclusion about the relative socio-
economic status of Catholics and non-Catholics in Scotland is that the data 
required to say anything more than the above is missing. However, in the 
absence of anything better, anecdote is not without its place. In this respect, 
it is worth noting that a recent collection of studies of poverty and 
deprivation in Scotland makes no mention of religion. The words 'religion', 
'sectarianism', 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' do not even appear in the index 
of Scotland: the real divide.(t3) Although a desire to avoid what is a 
politically sensitive issue may have had some bearing on these omissions 
from a work edited by two Scottish Labour MPs, I cannot believe that 18 
researchers studying the social distribution of income, educational 
opportunity, employment and wealth would all have conspired to 
completely pass over something of relevance to their findings. Similarly, 
one might note that, of the 385 items listed in the I986Scottish Government 
Yearbook bibliography of publications on Scottish politics and 
government, only two concern religion: one is my No Pope of Rome; the 
other is Bill Murray's The Old Firm! 
Segregation as Sectarianism? 
One commentator pointed to the degree of religious segregation which 
still exists in Scottish life as being evidence of the social importance of 
religious differences. The majority of Roman Catholic children are still 
educated in separate Catholic schools. There is still residential segregation 
and there is 'leisure' segregation. Protestants and Catholics support 
different (and often locally competing) football clubs. Especially in the 
larger lowland urban areas, there are Catholic and Protestant 'fraternal' 
associations and there are Protestant and Catholic drinking clubs and 
public houses. However, segregation is not necessarily evidence of 
discrimination (although it may be precisely that). The Roman Catholic 
Church may have begun its own school system because it felt that the public 
schools, having initially been Protestant church schools, would undermine 
the socialization of Catholic children in Catholic beliefs and culture. But 
since the end of the last century the public schools have been independent 
of the Protestant churches. From 1872 until 1927, they were managed by 
directly elected boards which had Catholic clergy members. (l 4) That a 
separate Catholic school system still exists is entirely due to the wish of the 
Catholic Church in Scotland to socialize Catholic off-spring in the culture 
and ethos of Catholicism. This can hardly be regarded as evidence of anti-
Catholic discrimination. 
It seems similarly inappropriate to take the voluntary segregation of 
leisure associations as evidence of discrimination. Some degree of 
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segregation follows inevitably from the desire of orthodox Catholics and 
Protestants to maintain their own religious cultures. To see separation as a 
'social problem' is to endorse improperly the view that religions should be 
liberal and ecumenical. Likewise, to regard membership of voluntary 
associations (such as the Orange Order or the Troops Out Movement) 
which support conflicting political positions as a matter of public concern, 
as something which modern democracies should have outgrown, is curious. 
It seems most sensible to confine the shorthand 'sectarianism', and the 
concern it connotes, to the maintenance or re-introduction into the public 
arena of religious particularisms which, in modern societies, are supposed 
to be confined to the private world. 
The question of whether there is in Scotland a degree of sectarianism 
which is significant, either because it is a neglected part of the operation of 
the social system or because it should cause 'right-thinking' people disquiet, 
should not be answered by a measure which includes voluntary association 
as an index. More properly, what is at issue is the extent to which private 
prejudices are acted upon in the public sphere so as to affect the lives of 
those who do not wish to be affected. It should not be a matter of public 
policy concern that the Church of Scotland only permits those who can pass 
certain doctrinal tests to enter into communicant membership. Similarly, it 
should not be a matter of great concern that Scots of Irish Catholic ancestry 
are far more likely than non-Hibernian Scots to support Irish Republican 
and nationalist movements. What would be evidence of enduring 
sectarianism would be the operation in the public sphere of what we permit 
as private opinion. Hence we need to ask whether Catholics fare 
significantly worse than non-Catholics in educational provision and 
performance, in the exercise of political rights, in the consumption of public 
goods such as state-funded housing, welfare benefits, health provision, and 
in the general indices of socio-economic status. Furthermore, once such 
data are presented, we need to know to what extent any identified 
disadvantage results from active discrimination. And, presumably, we 
would be interested initially in anti-Catholic discrimination. It is altogether 
another question if a population remains relatively disa9vantaged because 
it has performed the societal equivalent of shooting itself in the foot. It 
would be interesting if, as some radical Catholics have suggested, it was the 
case that the Church's insistence on maintaining its own school system was 
an own goal; interesting, but not what is conventionally thought of as 
evidence of sectarianism. 
I do not wish to propose a simple infrastructure-superstructure 
argument but it is generally the case that religion only remains an important 
base for 'secular' association when it is underpinned by shared socio-
economic characteristics. As Scottish Catholics have experienced upward 
mobility and come to spread themselves more evenly across the 
occupational spectrum their shared Catholicism has diminished as a source 
of identity and has, to a large extent, been superseded by class. More and 
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more middle class Catholics send their children to non-Catholic schools. 
Catholic fertility rates have declined to approach the norm for Protestant 
Scots. <15) Most significantly, the Catholic Church in Scotland's own 
statistics show that by the 1970s 'mixed' marriaSes were almost half of the 
total of all marriages contracted by Catholics. <1 
Explaining the Failure of Scottish Anti-Catholicism 
Some of the evidence which has been offered against the following 
argument misses the point and it is best to clarify the nature ofthe argument 
before the details are presented. That some Scottish Protestants and 
Catholics continue to dislike each other is neither here nor there. The 
argument is not that some time between 1850 and 1940 Scottish Protestants 
became tolerant, theologically liberal and ecclesiastically ecumenical. It is 
that some Scottish Protestants tried to act in a discriminatory manner but 
found that they lacked the wherewithal to act particularistically. However 
much some Protestants may have wished to maintain their economic, 
political, social and cultural advantages, a variety of forces outside their 
control radically reduced their ability to do so. Being unable to act on their 
world-view gradually led all but the most committed to abandon that world-
view. The clearest way of presenting an explanation of the decline of 
religious politics in Scotland is to offer comparisons between Scotland and 
Ulster. 
The first obvious difference between Scotland and Ulster is the greater· 
secularisation of the former. Whether one considers the involvement of 
individuals in organised expressions of religiousity, or the impact of 
religious values on the general culture and polity, one has to conclude that 
Scotland is less religious than Northern Ireland. <17l But this suggests a 
tautology; we explain the decline of anti-Catholicism in Scotland by arguing 
that religion matters less. To avoid the charmed circle we need to explain 
why religion matters less in Scotland. Part of that will involve elements 
particular to Protestant-Catholic conflict but there is a more general 
element. It is well-recognised that modernization and pluralism undermine 
religiousity. <18l Scotland is far more integrated into the British economy and 
into European culture than is Northern Ireland. Thus, even if relations with 
Catholics had not been an issue in either context, one would have expected 
Scotland to be the more secular. 
But if we concentrate on relations between Protestants and Catholics, 
a major difference between Scotland and Ulster can be found in the 
interaction between a high degree of internal fragmentation and the 
absence of external threat. I have argued in detail elsewhere that 
conservative Protestantism is inherently fissiparous. <19l However, the 
cohesion of Ulster Protestants suggests the point ably made by Durkheim, 
Simmel and Coser: cohesion may be created and maintained by the 
presence of an external threat. (ZO) I will first discuss the reasons why the 
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Irish Catholics in Scotland were not seen by Scottish Protestants as a threat 
of proportions similar to that posed by the Catholic majority in Ireland. I 
will then consider the roots of Scottish Protestant fragmentation. The 
interaction between these, the perceived threat to a group and its internal 
cohesion, explains the degree of anti-Catholicism. Having established that, 
I will turn to consider the ability of such anti-Catholics as remained to 
pursue their policies. 
The Irish Catholics in Scotland 
In the first place there were not all that many Catholics in Scotland. 
The best figures available suggest that the Catholics formed 9.2% of the 
population of Scotland in 1878, rising gradually to 13.7% in 1931 and 15.9% 
in 1977. (ZJ) In contrast, if one takes Ireland as a whole, Catholics form the 
vast majority of the population and in Northern Ireland, as constituted 
since 1926, they form more than a third of the population. (22) The total 
impact of the Irish Catholic immigrants on Scotland was considerably 
reduced by the concentration of their settlement in certain regions. 
Basically, they concentrated where industry was developing: Ayrshire, 
Lanarkshire, Glasgow, Dundee, Dunbarton, the Lothians and Edinburgh. 
And even within these areas, distribution was uneven. While Catholics 
formed 25.3% of the poguiation of Strathclyde Region in 1977, they were 
only 10.1% of Lothian. -3l Although Catholics were strongest in the most 
populous parts of Scotland, important organisations such as the Church of 
Scotland and the Free Church had a national structure which, although 
skewed towards population concentration, had been slow to adapt to 
movements of people. Thus in the period from 1890 to 1930- the crucial 
time for the career of anti-Catholicism- relations with Catholics were not a 
practical issue for much of the Church. 
The Irish Catholics in Scotland flirted with Irish politics, but generally 
they settled to regard themselves as Scots. While they acted to preserve 
their own religion and culture, they did not for long have a distinctive 
Catholic politics. (Z4l Unlike the Catholics of Ulster, Scottish Catholics were 
not intent on moving the Protestants of Scotland into another political 
formation. Hence the only way in which they could be seen as a 'threat' was 
to suppose that they would change dramatically the nature of Scotland from 
within and not many Scots, even those of a conservative Protestant faith, 
were convinced of that. (25l Although the idea was floated by some Catholic 
politicians, a specifically Catholic party, along the lines of the European 
Christian Democratic parties, was not formed. Instead Catholics became 
active in the secular Labour movement and in what became the Labour 
Party. This meant that a neat alignment of religion and politics could only 
be created if all or most Protestants supported the Unionist and later 
Conservative parties. But arguments between the supporters of the 
established Kirk, and the dissenting heirs to the Secession Churches (who 
were later joined by the Free Church) has caused elements of the urban 
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bourgeoisie and the Highlands who supported the Free Church to support 
the Liberal Party. The re-union of the majority of Presbyterians reduced 
the salience of the church establishment issue and thus helped erode the 
links between Presbyterianism and Liberalism. Some Protestants followed 
Liberal Unionists into the Conservative and Unionist fold but many, 
especially among the more theologically conservative Presbyterians, 
remained Liberals. 
The ability of the Conservatives to sustain a pan-class Orange vote was 
further undermined by them retaining far longer than their English 
counterparts an image of being a hunting, shooting and fishing party while 
the majoritr, of Orangemen were members of an urban industrial 
proletariat. (_o) The Tories' lack of responsiveness to Scottish concerns, the 
power of the Labour Party in local government, and the rise of Scottish 
nationalism all helped erode Protestant support. Any lingering attachment 
to the Conservative Party the Protestant working class might have carried 
into the nineteen eighties has been destroyed by the collapse of Scottish 
heavy industry which is, rightly or wrongly, blamed on the economic 
policies pursued since 1979 by the Conservative government. That 
government's Ulster policy has also offended many Orangemen. 
To summarise these three points, the Catholic presence in Scotland did 
not offer good evidence of a significant 'threat" to the Scottish Protestants, 
and hence did not act as a counter to the fragmentation which already 
existed and which increased between 1870 and the present. In contrast, 
relations between Protestants and Catholics in Ireland caused an increase 
in Protestant cohesion. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, one 
had considerable conflict between the Ulster Presbyterians and the more 
'Anglo' Irish of the Church of Ireland; reaction to Catholic demands for 
first emancipation and later home rule, brought Protestants in Ulster 
together into a homogenous political bloc. 
Scottish Protestant Fragmentation 
There were a number of sources of fragmentation in Scottish 
Protestant culture. The first major division was between Highlands and 
Lowlands. The topography of the Highlands delayed its development so 
that it was always out of step with Lowland Scotland. When the Lowlands 
were Protestant, the Highlands were Catholic and Episcopalian. By the 
time the Highlands had been converted to Calvinism, the Lowlands had 
become secularized and the dominant form of Protestantism, for those who 
still had any, was moderate, rational, and ecumenical. In language, custom, 
social relations, and economy, the two parts of Scotland have been so 
different as to challenge the usefulness of regarding the area north of the 
Solway sands and the Tweed as one country. 
As was the case with England, social differentiation produced a 
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fragmentation of the religious culture. In Scotland, the divisions were 
deeper and more far reaching. In part this was a result ofthe special place of 
the Christian Church in Scottish life. In the absence from Scotland of many 
of the institutions of a political system, the Presbyterian Church enjoyed an 
inflated importance for Scots. Furthermore, that the national church was 
Presbyterian, rather than Episcopalian, was important because the more 
'reformed' Presbyterianism gave greater opportunities of factionalism and 
schism than did the English national church, with its considerably lower 
rates of lay participation. Scottish Protestants spent most of the nineteenth 
century arguing with each other, rather than with Catholics, and produced 
a de facto pluralism which hastened secularization.<27l 
Political Impotence 
Some reviewers seem to have misunderstood the argument which I and 
Tom Gallagher have advanced. Neither of us is arguing that the desire to 
discriminate on the grounds of religious or ethnic background is now 
entirely absent in Scotland. Rather we have argued that even those Scots 
Protestants who wished to maintain discriminatory practices were unable to 
do so. Even had they been united, their chances of success were 
undermined by their political impotence. 
Protestant divisions might have been partly healed had there been a 
'pork barrel' to bribe dissenters, and the power to punish those who could 
not be sweetened. But Scotland had few such resources. Since the Union of 
the Crowns, real power has lain in London. The elites therefore have 
tended to see London and cosmopolitan values as their main point of 
reference. The limited number of members of the elite who wished to 
maintain a Protestant ascendency in Scotland did not have the power to 
fulfil their ambitions, and they had little to offer the Protestant working 
classes. In contrast, the Unionist elite in Ulster could make major 
concessions to the working class. They legalised the popular militias as the 
Special Constabulart28l and they discriminated in housing and local 
employment policy.< 9l 
The Ulster Unionists were popular enough to resist being incorporated 
in a united Ireland and for almost fifty years they had considerable control 
over many areas of life in Northern Ireland. Although subordinate to the 
British parliament at Westminster, the devolved parliament at Stormont 
could make its own policy on local government, employment, housing, 
education and policing; precisely those areas which would best serve to 
alienate the Catholic minority. The continued alienation of the Catholic 
minority then acted as a constant local reminder of the dangers to 
Protestants of incorporation into a united Ireland and hence maintained the 
religious and cohesion of the Protestant population. 
Scotland did not have that degree of control over its own affairs. The 
160 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1988 
only Scottish institution that still had some influence was the Church and it 
was divided. The Scottish Unionists could not offer much to militant 
Protestants because they were a small part of a party which represented 
England and Wales as well as Scotland. An example of their powerlessness 
was the failure of two Scots Unionist members of parliament- Sprot (North 
Lanarkshire) and Mcinnes Shaw (Renfrew)- to have Scotland exempted 
from the provisions of the 1926 Catholic Relief Bill. Scottish matters 
generally, let alone relations with Catholics which were only a concern for 
part of Scotland, had little impact on the British parties. Taking the other 
side of the coin, voters in Scotland knew that there was little point in 
electing anti-Catholic politicians such as Ratcliffe or Cormack to 
Westminster. What could one or even ten militant Protestants in 
Westminster have achieved? 
The devolution of some elements of public administration to the 
Scottish Office did not increase the ability of Scottish Protestants to 
discriminate against Catholics because the Office was controlled by the 
most cosmopolitan and 'anglicised' Scots. And the increase in 'planning' 
which has been characteristic of public administration in Scotland has been 
accompanied by the removal of power from local authorities through 
increased centralization. (30) 
Desire and ability interact. The obdurate reality of impotence is, for 
most people, enough to cause a gradual shift in desires until the situation 
that obtains is endorsed as being what was really wanted all along. A small 
proportion of mostly working class Protestants continue to wish to act in a 
sectarian fashion but the majority of Scots Protestants have, since the turn 
of the century, come to endorse a liberal culturally pluralistic tolerant 
society as being the sort of society they want. 
The Elements of Religio-Ethnic Conflict 
One very simple generalization can be drawn from the comparison of 
religious politics in Ulster and Scotland. The survival of Protestant politics 
requires an ideological element- a theory of the virtues of one's own people 
and the vices of some other group- and actual competition between the two 
populations. This does not mean that one requires actual competition 
between every member of both populations. The proposition is not refuted 
by pointing out that racist attitudes can be held by people in parts of 
America that have hardly ever seen a black. The 'actual' conflict can be 
fixed and made real for members of a society who themselves have not 
participated in it by the transmission of experiences through various media. 
Nonetheless, a sustained absence of actual competition for a large part of a 
population will reduce the plausibility and importance of the experience of 
the rest. This simple proposition explains the collapse of anti-Catholicism 
in Scotland and, by simple reversal, the maintenance of anti-Catholicism in 
Ulster. 
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The Highlands of Scotland retained a Calvinist evangelical Protestant 
faith but did not engage in any of the expressions of practical anti-
Catholicism. The Orange Order, the main organisation for popular anti-
Catholicism, has never had any support from above the Highland line. The 
Highlanders had the right theology for anti-Catholicism but not Irish 
Catholic immigrants. The Lowlands of Scotland were already well on their 
way to being a secular society by the time the Irish Catholics arrived in any 
great numbers. The main churches had either abandoned evangelical 
Protestantism or, even if they maintained it, had accepted pluralism. Of 
crucial importance is the observation that, as in most other societies, the 
urban working class of the Lowlands, the very people who were in day to 
day competition with the Irish Catholics, were not 'theologically' 
Protestant. The proletariat of Glasgow had the actual competition with 
Catholics but it lacked the ideological element to legitimate and sustain the 
conflict. The consequence of this is best seen if one moves from large-scale 
generalization to actual individuals and social movement organisations. 
Militant Protestant leaders in Glasgow such as Jack Glass and David 
Cassells (an independent evangelical with close links to Ian Paisley's Free 
Presbyterian Church of Ulster) are constrained by the absence of a general 
evangelical culture amongst those 'Protestants' who are prepared to 
campaign against Roman Catholics. They are forced to distance themselves 
from the supporters of the Orange Order and the recently formed 
paramilitary Protestant groups because they know (and their critics are 
quick to remind them) that the average Orangeman is not an evangelical, is 
not 'born again', is not a total abstainer, and does not keep the sabbath. 
Lowland militant Protestant leaders are forced to distance themselves from 
the only constituency which shares their willingness to protest against 
Catholics because that constituency possesses none of the other 
characteristics of evangelical Protestantism. 
Conclusion 
The comparison of relations between Protestant. and Catholics in 
Scotland and Ulster suggests that the factors important for the continuation 
of sectarian politics are: (a) the degree to which religion plays a part in the 
shared ethnic identities of the populations at the time they come into 
contact; (b) the extent to which conflict between the populations reinforces 
the part played by religious elements in the ethnic identity; and (c) the 
degree to which the populations involved have the power to act in support 
of their own interests. If one wishes to move beyond the already rather 
abstract notion of the interaction between internal fragmentation and 
external threat, the comparison of Scotland and Ulster suggest that the 
single simplest point that can be made concerns the degree of 
secularization. Confining ourselves to Protestantism, we can suppose that 
the internal dynamic of Protestantism is fission. Especially in the non-
Lutheran cases, Protestant churches (until the modem era in which 
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orthodoxy has been largely abandoned) have tended to divide. 
Protestantism inadvertently encourages pluralism. Exceptional 
circumstances are required to retard this dynamic and the classic 
exceptional circumstance is that of being confronted by a large population 
which shares a religious identity antithetical to that of the Protestants. In 
such a circumstance pluralism is not possible because it will mean not 
religious liberty for all but submersion and erosion. What is crucial then is 
the period in which the initial contact between the two populations 
occurred. The Protestants arrived in Ulster in the early eighteenth century. 
The Catholics arrived in Scotland in the nineteenth century. 
Steve Bruce, Department of Social Studies, Queen's University, Belfast. 
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